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1SEX, TRUST, AND CORPORATE BOARDS 
Joan MacLeod Heminway1
Many have indicated, directly or indirectly, that the highly publicized corporate 
fraud at Enron, WorldCom, HealthSouth, Adelphia, and other public companies 
represents or reflects a crisis of trust in corporate America.2 Directors of these 
corporations trusted their executives and each other, corporate executives trusted each 
other, and investors trusted both the directors and executives, in each case to their 
detriment.  The result?  Distrust of and among corporate constituencies.3
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, related federal administrative rulemaking and 
market regulation, and informal corporate governance principles and guidelines all have 
been constructed as means of addressing this perceived crisis.4 Among the specific 
 
1 Associate Professor, The University of Tennessee College of Law; A.B. 1982, Brown University; J.D. 
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2 E.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY 9-24 (2006); andre douglas pond cummings, “Ain't No 
Glory in Pain”: How the 1994 Republican Revolution and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
Contributed to the Collapse of the United States Capital Markets, 83 NEB. L. REV. 979, 1072 (2005) (“The 
litany of corporate fraud cases has undermined the public trust and generated support for more 
regulations.”). 
3 See, e.g., GfK NOP, Roper Public Affairs, Trust in American 2005: The TIAA-CREF Report, Sept. 2005, 
available at http://www.tiaa-cref.org/newsroom/pdf/2005_executive_summary.pdf. 
[S]igns of lack of trust and trustworthiness tend to be self-fulfilling. Once players in a social 
dilemma game come to believe that their fellows intend to defect, they themselves defect, and 
distrust prevails . . . . 
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate 
Law, 149 U. PENN L. REV. 1735, 1776 (2001). 
4 See, e.g., Laurie A. Morin, Broken Trust and Divided Loyalties: The Paradox of Confidentiality in 
Corporate Representation, 8 D.C. L. REV. 233, 240 (2004) (“As one story after another hit the press, 
lawmakers felt compelled to take action to restore public trust and confidence. The resulting legislation, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . ., enacted sweeping reforms to reign in the corporate excesses exemplified 
by Enron.” (footnote omitted)); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 86-90 (2003) 
(describing the regulatory reaction to the corporate fraud at the turn of the century); Larry E. Ribstein, 
Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 1 (2002) (describing both perceived problems involving trust and honesty and the 
regulatory and nonregulatory reforms); Tom D. Snyder, Jr., A Requiem for Client Confidentiality?: An 
2corporate governance reforms introduced in these initiatives are directives and 
suggestions relating to board composition.  These reforms especially focus attention on 
the need for, and the role of, independent directors on public company boards of directors 
and board committees.5 “Independence” is defined for these purposes in a narrow 
manner to include a lack of financial and other formal ties with the corporation outside 
the board room.6 Independent directors commonly are perceived as being less 
automatically trusting of corporate management and incumbents.  Moreover, independent 
directors may be perceived as more trustworthy than their insider counterparts.  However, 
scholars are, at best, mixed in their assessments of the value of this limited form of 
independence in fully resolving the crisis of trust represented by the corporate fraud 
scandals of the late 20th and early 21st Century.7
Attributes other than this narrowly conceived variety of independence may be 
important in addressing perceived lapses of trust through the mechanic of the corporate 
board.8 The possibility exists, for example, that sex—male or female status9—may be an 
 
Examination of Recent Foreign and Domestic Events and their Impact on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 50 
LOY. L. REV. 439, 452  (2004) (“The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 
2002, also referred to as the ‘Sarbanes-Oxley Act,’ was enacted, in part, to help restore trust in the U.S. 
financial markets”). 
5 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3) (Supp. 2003); New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual § 303A 
(November 3, 2004), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/section303Afinalrules.pdf; The NASDAQ 
Stock Market Inc., Corporate Governance, Rules 4200, 4200A, 4350, 4350A, 4351 & 4360 and Associated 
Interpretive Material (April 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/CorporateGovernance.pdf; American Stock Exchange Enhanced Corporate 
Governance Rules Approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission December 1, 2003, available at 
http://www.amex.com/?href=/atamex/news/amCorGov.htm; see Erica Beecher-Monas, Diversity in the 
Boardroom: Have You Come a Long Way, Baby? 1-2 (unpublished paper, on file with author); Ribstein, 
Market, supra note 4, at 11-12. 
6 Beecher-Monas, supra note 5, at 2, 6. See also, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate 
Federalism, and the Declining Significance of Federal Reforms on State Director Independence Standards,
31 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 381, 389 (2005) (“Sarbanes-Oxley narrowly defines independence with respect to 
compensation and a director's affiliation with the company.”). 
7 Id. at 4-5. 
8 A noted Delaware Chancery Court jurist intimates this in a 2002 article. 
Assuming that there are such things as truly “independent” directors, when and to what extent are 
we willing to trust their judgment? Is there some basis to believe that we should defer (i.e., give 
3attribute to consider when looking at restoring trust in and within the corporation.  To 
explore this possibility, this essay first summarizes recent scholarly works on sex and 
trust, focusing most closely on three studies of populations within the United States,10 
then makes observations and suggestions about the impact of these works on overall 
corporate decision making, and finally draws conclusions about board composition based 
on those observations and suggestions. 
I. RESEARCH ON GENDERED TRUST 
Trust is a significant area for psychological study, in general and across cultural 
and gender-based lines.11 This is not surprising.  Trust significantly impacts and reflects 
economic and social interactions in a cultural context.  A lack of trust can have serious 
deleterious effects on society.12 Scholars have begun to explore the extent to which trust 
may be gendered.  This part describes key elements of those scholarly explorations. 
 
business judgment rule deference) to decisions made by a board comprised of a majority of 
independent directors, but not those made by a board minority? Do we believe that deference 
should only be given if the independent directors are empowered to act on their own, with the 
active advice of financial and legal advisors, and without participation and involvement by 
insiders? 
These issues raise interesting psychological and sociological questions. What are the motivations 
that drive most directors? Are independent directors likely to behave in a more trustworthy and 
effective manner when they are in the majority? Or specifically charged as a separate committee to 
act only for the minority? 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations, 27 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 499, 505 (2002). 
9 The word “gender” (together with derivatives of that word), which is based on social construction, 
sometimes is used in lieu of the more strictly biologically referential term “sex” (or its derivative forms) in 
this essay. 
10 Some of the referenced supporting studies test populations outside the United States in addition to or 
instead of populations inside the United States.  Because of cultural differences in trust behaviors, the 
author has not relied on the findings of these studies in drawing her conclusions in this essay about U.S. 
corporate directors. 
11 See Nava Ashraf at al., Is Trust a Bad Investment? 7 (Nov. 2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=478881; William M. Maddux & Marilynn B. Brewer, 
Gender Differences in the Relational and Collective Bases for Trust, 8 GROUP PROC’S & INTERGROUP 
REL’NS 161 (2005). 
12 See Kessely Hong & Iris Bohnet, Status and Distrust: The Relevance of Inequality and Betrayal Aversion 
2 (Sept. 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=600642. 
4A.  Sex and Trusting13 
Trust, although variously defined in the literature,14 exposes the trusting person to 
vulnerability.15 Both men and women manifest trusting behavior in their relationships 
with others.  Research tends to indicate, to varying extents, that men and women exhibit 
trusting behaviors equally.16 However, scholarly work in this area continues to be refined 
and expanded.  Studies of sex and trust now are more nuanced, and the outcomes and 
interpretations of these studies therefore have become increasingly valuable.17 
For example, a recent study (the “Maddux & Brewer study”) indicates that men 
and women may differ in the bases for their trusting behavior.18 Specifically, the 
Maddux & Brewer study indicates that men base their trust in others most prominently on 
shared group status (collective trust), while women base their trust in others on both 
shared group status and the existence of personal relationships (relational trust).  This 
research follows on earlier work identifying two forms of “self”—collective and 
 
13 So as to avoid confusion over the use of the word “trust,” the author uses the term “trusting” to evidence 
a person’s trust in another and “trustworthiness” to signify a person’s capacity to engender the trust of 
others.  The concept of “trust” encompasses both. 
14 See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 1745 n.16; Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 515, 529-32 (2004); Susan P. Shapiro, The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 93 AMER. J. 
OF SOCIOLOGY 623, 625-26 (1987). 
15 Ashraf et al., supra note 11, at 2; Hong & Bohnet, supra note 12, at 3-11.  “We describe trust as a 
willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another . . . .”  Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 1739-40; id. at 
1746. 
16 See Rachel Croson & Nancy Buchan, Gender and Culture:  International Experimental Evidence from 
Trust Games, 89 AMER. ECON. REV. 386, 389-90 (May, 1999); Hong & Bohnet, supra note 12, at 24; Jana 
Vyrastekova & Sander Onderstal, The trust game behind the veil of ignorance: A note on gender 
differences 3-4, 11 (Aug. 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=807724.  
Some studies find that men are more trusting than women or that women are more trusting than men.  See 
Hong & Bohnet, supra note 12, at 24; Alessandro Innocenti & Maria Grazia Pazienza, Altruism and 
Gender in the Trust Game 2-3, 11-12 (May 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=884378. 
17 Many of the empirical studies referenced in this essay use “trust games” as their principal tool.  These 
tests admittedly may be limited in predictive value because of test parameters involving the sample.  For 
example, most trust games are run in university research settings, so the subjects are students.  Test subjects 
that have retired from the work force also are becoming more common.  However, studies involving trust 
games using working middle class subjects, which may be the most relevant population for purposes of 
gauging director behaviors, are rare. 
18 Maddux & Brewer, supra note 11, at 159-71. 
5relational—that correlate with gender.  The Maddux & Brewer study extends that earlier 
work further into the area of interdependent relationships by focusing on depersonalized 
trust.19 
The Maddux & Brewer study involves the online decisions of 147 students at The 
Ohio State University.20 Specifically, the students were asked to choose between receipt 
of a fixed financial payment ($3) from the researchers and receipt of an unfixed share of a 
larger amount ($11) from—and as allocated by—an unknown person.  Each student was 
given this option three independent times.  The difference in each case was the limited 
information given to the decisionmaker about the unknown allocator.  In one trial, the 
allocator was described as another student at The Ohio State University.  In another, the 
allocator was described as a student from another university at which the decisionmaker 
has an acquaintance (as indicated by previous responses to survey questions.  As a third 
trial option, the allocator was described as a student from another university at which the 
decisionmaker has no acquaintance.  The three trials were randomly ordered for each 
participant. 
Confirming prior research,21 men and women did not differ in the extent to which 
they chose the unknown allocation over the fixed payment.22 Moreover, both men and 
 
19 Id. at 159-61. 
20 The discussion in this paragraph is derived from the text id. at 163-65. 
21 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
22 Although Maddux and Brewer hypothesized that men would choose the fixed payment over the unknown 
allocation more often than women (which proved not to be the case), Maddux and Brewer theorize that 
male risk-taking preferences may have offset the expected result.  Maddux & Brewer, supra note 18, at 
168.  Another set of researchers offers the same and other explanations for similar results in other studies, 
Vyrastekova & Onderstal, supra note 16 at 4, although not all research corroborates the existence of 
gender-related risk preferences.  See Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Gender Diversity in the 
Boardroom 11-12 (Aug. 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=594506. 
The design and findings of studies indicating that men sometimes trust more than women may provide 
other answers.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  Moreover, it is interesting to note that a cross-
cultural study found that a woman’s decision whether to trust also may have a different basis than a man’s 
decision whether to trust.  Ashraf et al., supra note 11, at 24, 30 (“We find that women are motivated 
6women trusted the student from their own university about equally.  However, women 
trusted the student from another university at which they had an acquaintance 
significantly more often than men did.  From these outcomes, Maddux and Brewer 
conclude that “cross-group relationships had a greater impact on trust for women, while 
the categorical distinction between ingroup and outgroup was more important for men.”23 
B. Sex and Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness is variously defined and construed in the literature.24 The term 
often has been seen as exclusively or primarily related to trusting behavior as a reciprocal 
trait.25 (In other words, one trusts another who one believes to be trustworthy, and one 
who is trustworthy receives trust from another.)  However, many scholars now believe 
that both trust and trustworthiness may be at least somewhat independently motivated.26 
Research has begun to bear out this belief; trustworthiness may, but need not, be 
correlated with trusting behavior.27 Accordingly, this essay treats the concepts of trust 
and trustworthiness as conceptually, but not necessarily or always practically, linked. 
Many scholars have focused on other-regarding preferences28 (such as 
unconditional kindness29 or altruism30) and risk-aversion31 as determinants of 
 
differently than men when deciding about whether to trust or not, independent of their race or the country 
of origin: They trust conditional on their expectations of return.”). 
23 Id. at 168. 
24 For a taste of this variety and related interpretations of trusting behavior, see Innocenti & Pazienza, supra 
note 16, at 1-5.  “[T]rustworthiness  . . . [may be seen as] an unwillingness to exploit a trusting person’s 
vulnerability even when external rewards favor doing so.”  Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 1740. 
25 See Ashraf et al, supra note 11, at 2; Innocenti & Pazienza, supra note 16, at 3-4. 
26 See, e.g., Ashraf et al, supra note 11, at 2; Innocenti & Pazienza, supra note 16, at 3. 
27 Ashraf et al., supra note 11, at 2-5; Innocenti & Pazienza, supra note 16, at 13-14. 
28 In general these are decisions that take into account or otherwise involve other people. 
29 Unconditional kindness here means the derivation of personal satisfaction by benefiting others.  See 
Asraf, supra note 11, at 2. 
30 Although researchers do not tend to define this term in their work, we may assume that they are 
referencing “unselfish regard for or devotion to the welfare of others.”  MIRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 37 (11th ed. 2005). 
7trustworthiness.  Assessments of trustworthiness based on other-regarding preferences 
tend to be based on norms that 
are defined as valuations - internal to the strategic situation - of a certain choice. 
Women would tend to interpret the economic exchange more communally and 
empathically and thus to repay trust with trustworthiness in return more than men. 
Female behaviour would exhibit more trustworthiness because women’s 
preferences are more other-regarding than men’s.32 
Risk-aversion derives meaning from behavioral economics33 and is a self-protective, and 
therefore self-interested, behavior.34 Although other-regardedness and risk-aversion are 
the focus of the trustworthiness observations made in this essay, trustworthiness also can 
be explained by other attributes of trust relationships,35 including inequity aversion,36 
betrayal aversion,37 and warm-glow kindness.38 Significant ongoing work is being 
undertaken to better identify and define the bases for trustworthiness.  
31 This term describes “a net effect—a person’s willingness to accept the gamble of trust [that] depends on 
the costs she [a trustor] incurs if the worst possible outcome is realized and the benefits she derives from 
receiving the best possible outcome.”  Hong & Bohnet, supra note 12, at 5. 
32 Innocenti & Pazienza, supra note 16, at 5. 
33 As one group of researchers notes, 
Risk aversion plays a central role in economic theory. It helps us understand why individuals 
insure and save, why investors do not place all their eggs in the basket offering the highest 
expected payoff, and why entrepreneurs earn a generous premium. But risk aversion alone may 
not account for people’s willingness to take risk when the chance event is the action of other 
people rather than nature, for then additional considerations may enter. 
Bohnet et al., Betrayal Aversion on Four Continents 2 (Feb. 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=902370. 
34 The perceived risks may include risks of legal or market sanctions.  See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 
1747-50. 
35 E.g., Ashraf, supra note 11, at 2-3; Hong & Bohnet, supra note 12, at 4-7; Innocenti & Pazienza, supra 
note 16, at 1, 13-14. 
36 “Inequity aversion,” also known as “inequality aversion,” references a person’s strength of preference 
against being treated unequally by another and contrasts with the self-interest generally assumed by 
economic rationalists.  See Avner Shaked, The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion 4 (Mar. 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=675227.  One researcher explains inequity aversion by 
way of an example: “a player feels guilty when his material payoff is above others’ payoffs, while he feels 
envious when his material payoff is below others’. In other words, he dislikes either being ahead or being 
behind.”  Hideshi Itoh, Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences 3 (Sept. 2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=454500. 
37 “Betrayal aversion” represents a person’s strength of preference against another’s deceit or disloyalty.  
Iris Bohnet et al., The Elasticity of Trust: Evidence from Kuwait, Oman, Switzerland, the United Arab 
Emirates and the United States 13 (July 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=779484 (“a hesitancy to take on a trust risk because the 
8In general, the literature fairly consistently indicates that women are more 
trustworthy than men in a variety of test situations.39 Current studies provide additional 
evidence of this and other sex-based differences in trustworthiness.40 For example, in a 
number of trust-based and other studies, women test as more altruistic and more risk-
averse or risk-perceptive than men.41 (It should be noted here, however, that the trustor’s 
perception of the trustee’s altruism or risk-aversion may be more important than the 
reality.42) These sex-based differentiations, when compared to a relative lack of sex 
differentiation in trusting behavior, reinforce the possibility of different (but potentially 
overlapping) motivators or biological, social, or psychological markers for trust and 
trustworthiness. 
 
agent may not be trustworthy.”).  “Betrayal aversion comes into play when the agent of uncertainty is 
another person rather than nature. That is, people may be more averse to being betrayed by another person 
than to losing in a gamble.”  Bohnet et al., supra, at 11. 
Be you Shamus or Shakespeare, betrayal is a central theme of human behavior. Whether in the 
modern era or the ancient world, agents at times betray their principals. The executives of Enron 
and Tyco betrayed their shareholders, and Cassius betrayed Caesar. The implications of our strong 
findings on betrayal aversion are that shareholders would prefer a 1% chance of losing half their 
value due to a natural catastrophe than an equivalent chance and loss due to the malfeasance of 
corporate leaders; similarly, that political leaders would rather risk a 1% chance of being killed by 
accident than by a subordinate. Betrayal costs are real and significant, and thus require attention in 
our understanding of decision-making. 
Bohnet et al, supra note 31, at 14. 
38 “Warm-glow kindness,” as a basis for trustworthiness, has been described as “psychological benefits that 
an individual derives from being kind to others.”  Ashraf, supra note 11, at 3. 
39 See, e.g., Crosan & Buchan, supra note 16, at 390; Innocenti & Pazienza, supra note 16, at 3-4; 
Vyrastekova & Onderstal, supra note 16 at 2-3. 
40 Innocenti & Pazienza, supra note 16, at 11; Vyrastekova & Onderstal, supra note 16, at 11-12. 
41 See, e.g., Gary Charness & Uri Gneezy, Gender Differences in Financial Risk-taking 14 (Dec. 2004), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=648735 (“In every 
study that uses these simple investment choices, women make smaller investments than do men, 
and so appear to be financially more risk averse.”); Innocenti & Pazienza, supra note 16, at 14 (asserting 
that women are more altruistic than men); Dan M. Kahan et al., Gender, Race, and Risk Perception: The 
Influence of Cultural Status Anxiety 1-3 (Apr. 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=723762 (describing research indicating that women are 
more risk-perceptive than men); Alexandra Niessen & Stefan Ruenzi, Sex Matters: Gender and Mutual 
Funds 3 (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.cfr-cologne.de/downloads/workingpaper/cfr-06-01.pdf, 
(finding that female mutual fund managers invest in “moderately less risky portfolios,” “follow less 
extreme investment styles,” and have lower turnover ratios); id. at 5-6 (citing to other research on gender-
based risk-aversion and distinguishing the risk-aversion of female non-managers from that of female 
managers). 
42 Cf. Charness & Gneezy, supra note 41, at 1. 
9A psychological study reported in the late 1990s (the “Collins study”) profiling 
women’s psychological and biographical attributes supports the view that women have 
identifiable traits that may make them well suited to positions of trust and security.43 
Most importantly, the Collins study provides new profiling information about female 
white collar criminals.44 The Collins study indicates that (a) women may commit white 
collar crimes for reasons that are different from those motivating men45 and (b) women 
who commit white collar crimes have definable psychological traits that can be tested and 
vetted before they are called to corporate service.46 Among other things, these 
differences and traits indicate other-regarding preferences consistent with the results of 
prior and subsequent research on trustworthiness.47 
The Collins study analyzes the output from inventories administered to 243 
women, 71 of whom were imprisoned for white-collar crimes and 172 of whom were 
high-level corporate administrators and managers.48 These inventories measured various 
psychological and biographical variables, including socialization (compliance with social 
norms), self-control, empathy, responsibility, socioeconomic status, leadership activity, 
social involvement, parental relationship, sibling rivalry, and social dominance.  The 
results of these inventories then were tabulated and assessed using statistical analyses.  
 
43 Judith M. Collins & Michael D. Collins, Integrity in the Corporate Suite: Predictors of Female Fraud 7-
25 (Nov. 1999), available at http://www.internationalmta.org/Documents/1999/Proceedings1999.pdf. 
44 Female offenders, in general are an understudied population about which reliable data and analyses are 
just emerging.  See Michelle S. Jacobs, Loyalty's Reward -- A Felony Conviction: Recent Prosecutions of 
High-Status Female Offenders, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 843, 848 (2006).  This is particularly true in the 
area of white collar crime, where data is relatively scarce.  NEAL SHOVER & ANDY HOCHSTETLER,
CHOOSING WHITE COLLAR CRIME xv (2005) (“[T]he data available to investigators of white-collar crime 
pale in quality and comprehensiveness beside data available on street crime.”). 
45 Collins & Collins, supra note 43, at 20-21. 
46 Id. at 21-22. 
47 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. 
48 Except as otherwise noted, the description in this paragraph is derived from the text supra note 43, at 13-
14. 
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Interviews also were conducted.49 Among the findings are two key observations relevant 
to trustworthiness:  female white collar criminals report criminal behavior that can be 
described as other-regarding in an altruistic sense; and female white collar criminals are 
empathetic.50 
1.  Female White Collar Criminals are Other-Regarding 
Women in the Collins study who committed white collar crimes typically did so 
not to benefit themselves, but to benefit others.51 Moreover, each of these female 
offenders, to a one, expressed remorse for her crime.52 Although the Collins study does 
not involve a direct comparison of the attributes of female and male offenders, the 
researchers note that this female white collar offender profile is quite different from that 
for male offenders.53 It is significant to note that the other-regardedness exhibited by the 
female white collar criminals in the study was directed toward constituencies outside the 
corporation (i.e., toward family members, rather than toward shareholders or other 
corporate constituencies).54 Collins and Collins suggest that more work is needed to test 
sex-based differences in white collar offenders.55 
49 Id. at 21. 
50 A recent law review article submits that loyalty to a male wrongdoer may play a role in white collar 
crime offenses committed by women at high levels in corporate America.  Jacobs, supra note 44, at 874-75.  
This thesis provides an interesting, and consistent, corollary to the Collins study findings. 
51 Collins & Collins, supra note 43, at 21.  One cannot help but contrast, from our vantage point in 2006, 
Martha Stewart’s 2004 criminal conviction for obstruction of justice and false statements (which was based 
on actions taken by Stewart assertedly for her own benefit) with the convictions of the subject women 
offenders in the Collins study in this regard.  See Jacobs, supra note 44, at 863-64. 
52 Collins & Collins, supra note 43, at 21. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. (“The structured interviews revealed a common theme for the commission of the crimes: husbands, 
parents, or children were in financial trouble.  Several females said they committed the fraud because of 
health care and other problems for either parents or family.”). 
55 Collins & Collins, supra note 43, at 21-22.  Among other things, the authors note that the subjects of the 
study may not have responded honestly to the survey instrument.  Id. at 21. 
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2.  Female White Collar Criminals Exhibit Empathy 
The Collins study also finds that certain distinct personality and biographical 
characteristics exist for female white collar offenders and female non-offender corporate 
executives.  The researchers note that several of their findings relating to female 
offenders (notably, those regarding self-control and empathy) both deviate from the 
results reported in then existing literature focusing on male offenders and support a sex-
based distinction in the profiling of white collar criminals.56 
Especially important among these results is the finding that both female white 
collar criminals and female executives are empathetic.57 (Previous research indicates that 
male offenders lack empathy.58) As previously noted, empathy is a possible source of 
trustworthiness.59 The empathy manifested by female white collar criminals may lead 
others to deem them trustworthy, even in circumstances where that trustworthiness may 
not be warranted (based on other psychological and biographical traits of the woman).60 
3.  Bottom Line on Sex and Trustworthiness 
Based on the foregoing and other related findings in the Collins study, the 
researchers express their view that, among other things, the results of their study provide 
employers with information that is useful in promoting and conducting the psychological 
and biographical testing of women to better ensure their suitability in positions of trust 
and security.61 The traits predicting trustworthiness in female executives may be 
different from those predicting trustworthiness in male executives.  Said another way, 
 
56 Id. at 21-22. 
57 Id. at 21. 
58 Id. 
59 Specifically, empathy is an other-regarding trait associated with altruism.  See supra notes 28-30 & 32. 
60 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
61 Id. at 22. 
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women and men may be untrustworthy for different reasons.  In particular, although 
other-regarding preferences (including empathy) generally are labeled as determinants of 
trustworthiness, when taken alone, they may not be accurate indicators of trustworthiness 
in women. 
C.  Sex and the Overall Trust Relationship 
If women generally test as more trustworthy than men and exhibit and can be 
tested for traits that would indicate trustworthiness, then why are there so few women in 
the corporate executive ranks and on public company boards of directors?62 Of course, 
historical influences favoring homogeneous corporate boards persist.63 Moreover, the 
pool of talent from which corporate directors typically are chosen includes few women.64 
Also, education of the relevant populations (corporate directors, in principle part) as to 
the positive attributes of female directors (identified in an emerging scholarly literature) 
likely has not occurred to the extent necessary to make an impact.  However, the 
possibility also exists that there is a bias against women corporate leaders.65 That bias is 
being observed and documented in current research. 
A recent study (the “Bigelow & McLean Parks study”) provides evidence that 
investors do not trust female corporate leaders.66 Specifically, the Bigelow & McLean 
Parks study concludes that, despite evidence of the success of women in the corporate 
 
62 Professor Lisa M. Fairfax summarizes the progress of women and people of color on corporate boards of 
directors in her articles entitled: Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women Directors and 
Continued Barriers to their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 581-89 (2006) [hereinafter Mixed Data], 
and Some Reflections on the Diversity of Corporate Boards: Women, People of Color, and the Unique 
Issues Associated with Women of Color, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1105 (2005) [hereinafter Reflections]. 
63 See Beecher-Monas, supra note 5, at 13. 
64 See Fairfax, Mixed Data, supra note 62, at 599-601 (2006); Fairfax, Reflections, supra note 62, at 1112-
13. 
65 Fairfax, Mixed Data, supra note 62, at 601-02. 
66 Lyda S. Bigelow & Judi McLean Parks, Skirting the Issues: A “Green Ceiling” for Female Entrepreneurs 
(unpublished paper, on file with author). 
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environment, prospective investors in an initial public offering (“IPO”) are willing to 
invest more in a corporation that has a male Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”)67—and 
they also are willing to compensate that male CEO better than they would compensate a 
woman with the exact same qualifications for service in that exact same role!68 
The Bigelow & McLean Parks study involved a survey conducted with 222 
students in a Masters in Business Administration program.69 Participants were given 
background reading materials, including a variety of investment information, relating to 
the IPO of a fictitious corporation and were asked to respond to a survey regarding the 
CEO and the senior management team (referred to in the study as the “top management 
team” or “TMT”).  Among the background reading materials was a summary of the 
qualifications of the CEO and other senior executives of the corporation.  In materials 
given to certain of the test subjects, the CEO and some or all of the depicted management 
members were female, and in others, the CEO and some or all of the TMT were male.70 
In each case, the gender of the executives was indicated using photographs and gendered 
names.  These sex differences were the only variables in the background reading 
materials; financial factors relating to the fictitious corporation, for example, were not 
altered in the materials.71 The study tested a variety of reactions based on both the sex of 
the CEO and the sex distribution of the senior management team. 
 
67 Id. at 24. 
68 Id. at 25. 
69 Except as otherwise noted, the summary in this paragraph is derived from the text id. at 18-19. 
70 Sex distributions within the TMT varied from homogeneous (all one sex), to skewed (85%/15%), to tilted 
(65%/35%), to balanced (50%/50%).  Id. at 19. 
71 Id. at 30 & 31.  To enhance the realism of the investment information offered to participants, the 
researchers used the financial statements from a real IPO in their test materials.  Id. at 31. 
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The sex of the CEO was significant over all tested areas, including assessments 
related to the senior management team.72 In each case, participant evaluations of the 
CEO and the management team were less favorable when the CEO was female.  Among 
other things, the participants: would invest almost three times as much in the male CEO-
led corporation;73 more positively evaluated the skills of the male CEO than those of the 
female CEO;74 allotted the female CEO only 86% of the compensation allotted to the 
male CEO;75 and judged the management team more favorably when it was led by the 
male CEO.76 “That gender stereotypes had such a significant impact on the amount that 
naïve investors were willing to invest; on the perceived qualification of the CEO, 
qualifications that were identical in every way; and, through the CEO, on perceptions of 
the TMT process, is more than a little troubling.”77 
Interestingly, the demographic mix of the senior management team did not test as 
significant to the participant investors.  Participants did not isolate significant differences 
in strategic assessments, capabilities, or processes based on the sex composition of the 
 
72 Bigelow and McLean Parks summarize the results in this regard as follows: 
Based on our data, we find that the sex of the CEO is the only salient evaluative component of the 
top management team to naïve investors. Our sample suggests that the market does not “see” sex 
as a predictor of potentially better performance (and, of course, once they do, the market will 
accommodate it in pricing, and the effect will disappear). Disconcertingly, they do pick up on sex 
as a marker, but their stereotypes overwhelm their interpretation of the marker, potentially causing 
them to make poor decisions. 
Id. at 28. 
73 Id. at 24. 
74 Id. at 23-24. 
75 Id. at 25. 
76 Id. at 23-24. 
77 This conclusion and the related findings in the Bigelow & McLean Parks study are similar to the 
conclusion and findings of another recent study involving sex differences in mutual fund managers.  See 
Niessen & Ruenzi, supra note 41, at 3-4 (noting that inflows to female-managed mutual funds are lower 
than those to male-managed funds, despite (a) the lack of a significant difference in average portfolio 
performance and (b) more persistent performance of female-managed portfolios, and attributing these 
findings to “stereotyping of fund investors who for some reason believe male managers do a better job in 
managing money”). 
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overall management team (apart from the female CEO factor earlier noted).78 These 
findings regarding the sex composition of management teams are, indeed, quite 
surprising when compared to the results regarding the sex of the CEO.  However, 
Bigelow and McLean Parks caution that their manipulation of the demographics of the 
board may have unintentionally affected these results.79 
II. SEX, TRUST, AND CORPORATE DECISION MAKING 
The relationship of existing, general research relating to sex and trust to corporate 
decision making is not clear or conclusive.  Moreover, trust games, inventories, 
interviews, and other testing devices represented in the literature are admittedly imperfect 
tools for measuring and classifying trusting behavior and trustworthiness, and study 
design or implementation in individual cases may be less than optimal.80 For these 
reasons, one must be cautious about extrapolating too much from the few gender-based 
studies regarding trust that are summarized and cited to in Part I of this essay.  However, 
even from this imperfect knowledge base, certain limited, preliminary observations and 
suggestions may be made.  These observations and suggestions emanate from 
interpretations of the study results on sex and trust in light of existing empirical and 
theoretical corporate governance scholarship. 
In general, existing trust research tells us that both men and women are trusting, 
and both men and women may be trustworthy.  These general conclusions are important 
 
78 Bigelow & McLean Parks, supra note 66, at 23. 
79 Id. at 29. 
80 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 1777-78; supra note 79.  In particular, it should be noted that the 
Maddux & Brewer study and the Bigelow & McLean Parks study involve student test subjects, which may 
limit the applicability of the results of these studies to other populations.  Moreover, the Collins study 
involves self-reported traits and behaviors, which may give rise to nonobjective, inaccurate, or otherwise 
faulty data.  See Collins & Collins, supra note 43, at 21.  Finally, the Collins study does not differentiate 
among female white collar offenders by corporate position or crime, which may limit the applicability of its 
results in this context.  See Jacobs, supra note 44, at 849-50. 
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in relation to corporate decision making.  Trust—both trusting behavior and 
trustworthiness—is essential to the effective operation of the corporation in general81 and 
the constitution and operation of a corporate board and corporate management in 
particular.82 Trust is at the heart of the fiduciary relationships that characterize corporate 
governance and comprise the corporation.83 Moreover, without trust, consensus would be 
difficult to achieve and decision making would be inefficient.84 However, trust also has a 
negative side.  Trust may be misplaced, both by board members or executives and on
board members or executives. 
Gender differences in the bases for trusting behavior are not apparently value-
laden in a general sense; women are not necessarily better or less well suited to being 
directors or executives than men based on existing research on trusting behavior.  Neither 
collective nor relational trust is superior to the other, taken in the abstract.   They are 
merely different rationales for trusting.  However, taken in a particular context, one form 
of trusting behavior may be implicated where another may not.  Based on these 
 
81 Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 1757-58. 
82 See, e.g., id. at 1738. 
83 Cf. id. at 1743-44. 
84 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 152-54, 341-
42 (1995) (outlining reductions in transaction costs and other efficiencies occasioned by trusting behaviors 
in business); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the 
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 812-13 (2001) 
(exploring effects on board productivity of mistrust and trust between corporate boards and chief executive 
officers).  See also Leslie, supra note 14, at 532-33 (describing the general relationship between trust and 
cooperative behavior). 
Where trust can be harnessed, it can substantially reduce the inefficiencies associated with both 
agency and team production relationships.  Trust permits transactions to go forward on the basis of 
a handshake rather than a complex formal contract; it reduces the need to expend resources on 
constant monitoring of employees and business partners; and it avoids the uncertainty and expense 
associated with trying to enforce formal and informal agreements in the courts.  Trust behavior 
also reduces losses from others’ undetectable or unpunishable opportunistic behavior, losses that 
could discourage the formation of valuable agency and team production relationships in the first 
place. 
Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 1757. 
17
observations, how, then, might collective and relational trust impact corporate decision 
making? 
For one, if male or female board members view themselves as being in the same 
“group” as corporate management, they may be more likely to trust management, even 
where management is being dishonest or misleading.  The same may be said of women 
who have relational connections with corporate management.  Similarly, male or female 
directors or executives who view other individuals on the board or management team, 
respectively, as members of their “group”85 may be more likely to trust the consensus of 
that group and engage in “groupthink”86 or other herding behaviors87 in their collective 
decision making that may be detrimental to the corporation and its shareholders.  
Similarly, female directors or executives with personal relationships connecting them to 
other directors or executives, respectively, may be more likely to trust those others in 
their collective decision making, even when that trust proves detrimental to the 
corporation and its shareholders.  Either basis for trusting behavior, collective or 
relational, when unchecked by independent thought and inquiry, may lead to suboptimal 
monitoring and management.  Facts and circumstances relating to each individual 
corporate director and executive and each distinctive set of corporate directors and 
executives determine whether, and if so, which, type of trust may operate.  These facts 
 
85 There is evidence that board tenure is positively related to group status among board members.  See 
Langevoort, supra note 84, at 811 (“[O]nce on the board, social ties build so that, as Cox and Munsinger 
demonstrated in their study of board structural bias, those members committed to the group gradually 
develop a sense of ‘in-group’ bias that colors how they evaluate claims by others (such as derivative 
lawsuits brought by shareholders) that threaten one or more group members.”). 
86 See Langevoort, supra note 84, at 810 (“That phrase, invented by Irving Janis, refers to the tendency of 
cohesive groups implicitly (indeed, subconsciously) to censor nonpreferred points of view and any 
information inconsistent with what is preferred.” (footnote omitted)); see also Marleen A. O'Connor, The 
Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1238-39 (2003). 
87 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why A Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 27-29 (2002); Beecher-Monas, supra note 5, at 11; Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1490-91 (2005); A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing 
Corporate Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 28 (2003). 
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and circumstances necessarily will be fluid as board and management team membership 
and individual director and executive knowledge and experience change over time.88 
The coexistence of both forms of trusting behavior—collective and relational—on 
corporate boards of directors and management teams, however, may create the 
opportunity and need for independent thought and inquiry.  In a cooperative 
decisionmaking environment, where one board member is willing to trust an officer of 
the corporation or a fellow board member and another is not, decision making logically 
will require more reflection and deliberation than where all agree to trust.  This reflection 
and deliberation improves the decisionmaking process and is likely to generate a more 
well-considered decisional output.89 Therefore, the very fact that board members and 
managers trust differently therefore may be beneficial to corporate decision making.  This 
 
88 It is important to note that these effects may be time-sensitive.  Studies on trusting and trustworthiness 
generally test trusting behavior toward and trustworthiness of “strangers”—those previously unknown to 
the trustor on an individual basis.  After a time, directors and executives likely would become “known 
quantities” to each other, which may have the tendency to increase collective or relational trust. 
89 Cf. Beecher-Monas, supra note 5, at 7-8 (“In an information cascade, decisions are made by people 
following the decisions of those around them rather than relying on their own private information.  . . .  
With a group that fosters the voicing of differing viewpoints and dissent, this effect should be minimized. 
That of course, is a strong reason to advocate diversity in the boardroom.”); id. at 9 (“[D]iverse boards 
make better decisions.  . . .  It seems fairly intuitive that individuals with diverse perspectives and 
backgrounds will enlarge the scope of any discussion, considering alternatives and bringing more 
information to the table.  People with different backgrounds ought to have not only different perspectives, 
but varied approaches to assessing information, which should, in theory at least, lead to better decisions.” 
(footnote omitted)); id. at 10 (“Although a group of diverse dummies cannot be expected to reach better 
collective decisions than a single smart expert, a group whose members possess a variety of skills, 
knowledge, and aptitude will outperform a small group of experts. Collective decisions that are achieved 
through disagreement and contest are superior to those achieved through consensus or compromise.” 
(footnote omitted)); Langevoort, supra note 84 at 810-11 (“The most productive boards are ones that have 
enough diversity to encourage the sharing of information and active consideration of alternatives, but 
enough collegiality to sustain mutual commitment and make consensusreaching practicable within the tight 
time frames in which boards must operate.”).  This assumes that the directors can engage in cooperative 
behavior that is conducive to informed decision making.  See Adams & Ferreira, supra note 22, at 2 (“To 
increase board effectiveness it may not be enough to simply increase the number of female directors on the 
board; diverse boards may require additional mechanisms to ensure cooperation between directors”). 
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argues for diversification on the basis of gender at the highest levels of the corporation as 
a means of diversifying trusting behaviors among corporate decision makers.90 
Corporate boards and management also may benefit from gender diversitification 
because of differences in or relating to the trustworthiness of men and women.  For 
example, because women typically are more other-regarding than their male counterparts, 
they may be less likely than men to take action for their own personal benefit and more 
likely to take action (lawful or unlawful) for the benefit of others, including the 
corporation and its shareholders.  Accordingly, the presence of women on a corporate 
board or as corporate executives may help avoid the replication of certain perceived 
contributing causes of the fraud identified at Enron and other corporations (including 
especially the acknowledged possibility that corporate officers, many of whom also were 
directors, manipulated corporate financial and other disclosures in order to enhance their 
own equity-based compensation).  Avoidance of these agency costs may help enhance the 
overall trustworthiness of boards.91 
We also know, however, that other-regarding women may be white collar 
criminals.  We do not know much from the Collins study about either (a) the nature of the 
positions these female offenders occupied at the time their crimes were committed or (b) 
the nature of the white collar crimes that these women committed.  These facts would be 
helpful in assessing the applicability of the finding of the Collins study to gendered 
 
90 See infra note 98 regarding arguments for board diversity.  Cf. Beecher-Monas, supra note 5, at 9-10 
(making this point about differences in male and female traits generally).  It is important to note that any 
considerations weighing in favor of gender diversification on the basis of trust-related issues should be 
balanced against countervailing considerations, including any related costs.  See, e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 
supra note 22, at 19-20 (describing some of these costs, based on their findings).  Among other things, 
“[d]iverse boards may require additional incentives to work cooperatively and may require additional time 
to digest different viewpoints and resolve disagreements.”  Id. at 17. 
91 However, the other-regarding and empathetic nature of women may not alone be an accurate indicator 
that women are more trustworthy than men, as the Collins study indicates.  See generally Part I.B.3. 
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trustworthiness in corporate decision making.  But we do know that these other-regarding 
women may take unlawful action to benefit someone outside the corporation.  In other 
words, although not acting for herself, a female director or executive may make decisions 
on behalf of the corporation to benefit people or constituencies other than the corporation 
and its shareholders.  This behavior has the potential of being as detrimental to the 
corporation and its shareholders as the self-interested behavior associated with the Enron 
debacle and other recent corporate scandals.  Among other things, both behaviors may 
constitute breaches of the state corporate law fiduciary duty of loyalty—or, worse yet, 
criminal activity.  Accordingly, the other-regarding nature of women may or may not be a 
positive gendered characteristic for a corporate director or executive. 
Further, female trustworthiness may be based on more than mere other-regarding 
preferences.  As the overall trust literature indicates, female trustworthiness also may be 
linked to risk-aversion. 92 To the extent that the trustworthiness of women is based on 
risk-aversion, women may be deemed less desirable as directors or executives.  Investors 
desire and expect that corporate directors and managers will take some risks in their 
decision making—conscious, well considered risks for the benefit of the corporation and 
its shareholders.  Further, managers may desire to take risks for the benefit of the 
corporation and its shareholders that risk-averse directors do not embrace.  In short, 
female board members or executives may be less able than male directors or executives 
to meet the risk expectations of managers or investors. 
However, even if female directors and executives are more risk-averse than male 
directors and executives, this different risk preference may add valuable diversity to a 
corporate board or management team by changing the presumptive risk profile of the 
 
92 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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board or management.  As with diverse trusting behaviors, diverse risk preferences may 
enrich corporate decision making.  The risk-takers and the risk-averse will be required to 
discuss and deliberate to achieve consensus.93 With different risk preferences, a 
corporate board or management team should have the capacity to engage in better quality 
decision making. 
Yet, the research telkls us that directors and investors may have to overcome 
latent biases against female corporate leaders to accomplish any desired gender 
diversity.94 Under current corporate law, securities regulation, and general practice, 
directors are identified and nominated by a committee or the whole of the existing board 
of directors.95 The corporation’s shareholders then have the right to vote on nominees 
selected by that committee or board.  Similarly, corporate officers generally are elected or 
appointed by the board of directors.  Accordingly, any anti-female bias that exists at the 
board or investor level—but especially, under current rules, at the board level—may 
handicap efforts to accomplish gender diversity on corporate boards and in corporate 
management teams, regardless of the benefits that may be achieved by that gender 
diversity.96 
93 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
94 This sex bias compounds a recognized general bias against diversity.  See Langevoort, supra note 84, at 
811.  However, the literature does not uniformly support a bias against diversity.  See Adams & Ferreira, 
supra note 22, at 3 (referencing the results of various studies in this regard).  The results of the Bigelow & 
McLean Parks study as to senior management teams, for example, may provide some evidence that women 
are not the subject to bias when part of a larger group.  See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
95 Fairfax, Mixed Data, supra note 62, at 599. 
96 Gender diversity on boards has been increasing, and is predicted to continue to increase, at a slow rate. 
See Fairfax, Mixed Data, supra note 62, at 581-89. 
The number of women directors at Fortune 500 companies appears to have increased by at least 
1% over the last five years. If these patterns persist, then within the next twenty years, virtually all 
Fortune 500 companies, and perhaps even most all Fortune 1000 companies, may have at least one 
woman on their boards. 
Fairfax, Reflections, supra note 62, at 1109 (footnotes omitted).  See also Robin Cohen & Linda Kornfeld, 
Women Leaders Boost Profit, Barron’s, Sept. 4, 2006, at 37 (noting evidence of the positive relationship 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Corporations are managed by or under the direction of their boards of directors.  
As corporate decision makers, directors are critically important to corporate governance.  
If there is a locus of trust in the corporation, it is the board.  Directors are the macro-level 
corporate managers, making organization-critical decisions and monitoring the decision 
making of the corporations officers, the day-to-day managers of firm operations.  The 
Board elects or appoints those corporate officers, and the board (or a committee of its 
members) identifies and selects, subject to shareholder approval, its own members.  
Accordingly, if trust issues are to be addressed in corporate America, the board should be 
the key focal point.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 recognizes this, but narrowly takes 
aim at the perceived crisis in trust by using a restricted definition of director 
independence as a cure-all.  Based on existing research in the social sciences, another 
possible and promising focus for further inquiry and activity is gender diversity.  
This essay has a limited objective.  It seeks not to add to or resolve the different 
findings and musings of empiricists and theoreticians on trust, sex, or board composition.  
Rather, this essay begins to tell a story about the relationship among sex, trust, and 
corporate boards based on interpretations of existing bodies of scholarly work in these 
areas.  The purpose of telling this fledgling tale is to further illuminate legal issues 
surrounding board composition in the wake of our recent bout of corporate fraud and the 
legislation and regulation that followed.  As yet, the “sex, trust, and corporate boards 
story” has a broad title, a meandering plot, missing pages, and a tentative narrative and 
conclusion.  Truly, this essay is part of a larger volume of short stories still in process, as 
 
between women corporate leaders and corporate financial success, but cautioning that “the road toward 
gender parity in Corporate America still is long.”). 
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sex is only one of many factors that have been, or undoubtedly will be, identified as 
relevant to trust and the overall composition of boards of directors.  The essential 
narrative of this nascent tale can, however, be simply stated in the few short sentences 
that immediately follow. 
Recent scholarly work on sex-based differences in trusting behavior and 
trustworthiness may have utility in determining optimal corporate board composition.  
For example, the studies profiled and described in this essay indicate that men and 
women trust and are trustworthy on different bases.  Accordingly, the inclusion of female 
members on boards of directors may positively influence board process and deliberations 
by diversifying the bases for trusting behaviors and trustworthiness in the boardroom.  
However, the benefits of gender diversity on boards of directors may be difficult to 
achieve based on underlying biases against women in corporate leadership positions. 
What will it take to confirm and flesh out the components of this basic narrative?  
Among other things, more targeted empirical and theoretical work should be done to 
directly test and explore the effects of sex-based trust issues in the corporate 
decisionmaking context to permit more refined conclusions and solutions.  Specifically, 
researchers should theorize and test the trusting behaviors and trustworthiness of male 
and female directors of varying tenures on various different kinds of corporate boards.97 
Moreover, female perpetrators of white collar crimes should be studied on a more 
detailed basis.  In each case, the knowledge gained from these studies should enable 
directors and investors to better screen possible board nominees for psychological and 
biographical traits that best indicate trustworthiness and desired bases for trustworthiness.  
 
97 Studying directors of varying tenure will be important since the typical trust game conducted in the cited 
studies measures trust among relative strangers, not those with long-term, ongoing relationships.  See supra 
note 88. 
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Also, directors’ and investors’ bases and capacities for bias against female directors 
should be more closely examined to ensure that optimal board composition is achievable, 
even as these constituencies gain increased knowledge of the potential benefits of gender 
diversity on corporate boards.  In general, the results of these additional studies may 
expose corroborating or new evidence that will enable a more direct and nuanced 
assessment of the relationship among sex, trust, and corporate boards. 
Even in the absence of this further targeted research, however, directors and 
investors may want to consider the impact of existing broad-based research on gender 
and trust in determining whom to nominate and elect to corporate boards.  In particular, it 
may be advisable to further encourage gender diversity on corporate boards based on the 
apparent relationship between gender diversity and trust diversity.  This suggestion 
emanates from the existing research on sex and trust, but it is consistent with proposals 
made by other scholars on different grounds.98 Because of differences in their bases for 
 
98 See, e.g., Adams & Ferreira, supra note 22, at 19, 20 (noting that their “results suggest quite strongly that 
in boards with relatively more women, more directors participate in decision-making, which may enhance 
their effectiveness” and concluding that “increasing gender diversity may benefit firms in which 
performance-related pay is less costly.”); David Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and 
Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33 (2003) (offering and analyzing data on the value of overall board diversity); 
Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. 
REV. 1363, 1383-87 (2002) (discussing gender diversity, among other things, and its various impacts on 
corporate management); O'Connor, supra note 86, at 1306-15 (regarding board diversity generally); 
Fairfax, Mixed Data, supra note 62, at 589-98 (summarizing and assessing arguments in this regard); 
Marleen O'Connor-Felman, American Corporate Governance and Children: Investing in our Future 
Human Capital During Turbulent Times, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1258, 1349-51 (2004) (illuminating her 
proposal that “[s]hareholder proposals to implement work-family policies should recommend nominating 
more women, and particularly mothers, to corporate boards.”); Donald J. Polden, Forty Years After Title 
VII: Creating an Atmosphere Conducive to Diversity in the Corporate Boardroom, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 67, 
69 (2005) (“Improved gender and racial diversity of corporate governing boards would enhance SOX's 
fundamental policy of increased integrity in the management of large corporations through greater 
independence and competence of their directors.”); Janis Sarra, The Gender Implications of Corporate 
Governance Change, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 457, 493-94 (2002) (setting forth certain benefits of diversity 
on corporate boards); Nina Smith et al., Do Women in Top Management Affect Firm Performance? A 
Panel Study of 2500 Danish Firms, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=780910 
(Aug. 2005), at 2-4 (summarizing arguments in support of gender diversity of corporate boards); Hayley 
Buckridge, Note: Merging Without Purging: Incentivizing Boards of Directors to Promote Diversity 
through M & A, 20 ST. JOHN'S J.L. COMM. 443, 496-99 (2006); see also Fed’l Glass Ceiling Comm’n, A
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trusting behavior and trustworthiness, female directors may exhibit trusting behaviors or 
trustworthiness in different circumstances or environments than male directors exhibit 
trusting behaviors and trustworthiness.  As this essay argues, the very existence of a 
difference in trust on a corporate board may be beneficial.  Among other things, varied 
bases for trusting and trustworthiness among board members should enhance 
thoroughness and caretaking in the boardroom, since not all directors initially will trust or 
be trusted by the same people.  This thoroughness and caretaking should enhance trust in 
and among the various corporate constituencies.  
In sum, both the examination of existing broad-spectrum research on sex and trust 
and the engagement of scholars in more specialized research involving sex and trust in 
the context of board decision making are important to ongoing debates in the area of 
corporate governance.99 In particular, as legal and other scholars continue to theorize and 
test ways to increase trust in and among the constituencies comprising the corporation 
and as scholars and rule makers consider possible legal, regulatory, and other reforms 
targeted directly or indirectly at the same, more detailed knowledge of the bases for 
trusting behavior and trustworthiness will be essential.100 Only with this further 
information will we best know how to effectively and appropriately address important 
 
Solid Investment: Making Full Use Of The Nation's Human Capital 5 (1995); Am. Mgmt. Ass'n, 1998 AMA 
Survey Senior Management Teams: Profiles and Performance (visited June 30, 2006), available at 
http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/senior.pdf, at 1 (“Heterogeneity -- a mixture of genders, ethnic 
backgrounds, and ages in senior management teams -- consistently correlates to superior corporate 
performance.”). 
99 Accord Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 1810 (“A solid understanding of the social and economic 
circumstances that elicit trust behavior is accordingly vital to our understanding of a wide range of social 
and legal institutions, including corporations and corporate law.”). 
100 Cf. Ashraf et al., supra note 27, at 6 (“If policy makers wish to raise the level of trust, they need to know 
the determinants of trust. If trust is mainly a function of expected trustworthiness, they should focus on the 
level of trustworthiness and on beliefs about that level. In contrast, if trust is mainly motivated by warm-
glow kindness, they should focus on fostering of intrinsic rewards.”); Hong & Bohnet, supra note 12, at 27 
(“This paper suggests that anyone wishing to increase people’s willingness to trust may benefit from taking 
the status differences in the relative importance of various motives into account and use the corresponding 
institutional devices to address them.”). 
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unresolved questions relating to both trust and gender diversity relative to corporate 
boards of directors. 
